WP Security CheckVulnerability data as of October 17, 2026

Vulnerability alerts / October 16, 2026

Vulnerability in InstaWP Connect – 1-click WP Staging & Migration — CVE-2026-109400

HighSeverity
CVSS 7.5
0.4%Estimated exploit probability
EPSS
40,000+ sitesInstalls
0.1.4.2Fixed in

What to do now

Update InstaWP Connect – 1-click WP Staging & Migration to 0.1.4.2 or later.

Affected versions

  • Everything up to and including 0.1.4.1

Affected: InstaWP Connect – 1-click WP Staging & Migration (plugin, instawp-connect)

Check: The plugin on wordpress.org / Our record for InstaWP Connect – 1-click WP Staging & Migration

What the vulnerability is

The InstaWP Connect – 1-click WP Staging & Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 0.1.4.1 This is due to the plugin registering its admin page via `add_management_page()` using a role name returned by `InstaWP_Setting::get_allowed_role()` as the required capability — which WordPress resolves as a real capability match for any user holding that role — combined with `generate_section_field()` rendering the master API key from the `instawp_api_options` option directly as the `value` attribute of a plain-text HTML input with no additional `manage_options` or equivalent capability check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access and above to read the plaintext master API key, use its SHA-256-derived secret as a bearer token accepted by the plugin's REST API `validate_api_request()`, and call `POST /wp-json/instawp-connect/v2/auto-login` to mint a 30-second single-use login URL that sets an administrator authentication cookie — fully escalating their privileges. Exploitation requires the site to be actively connected to InstaWP and an administrator to have added the attacker's role to the plugin's Sync Tab Access list (`instawp_sync_tab_roles`); notably, the settings tab suppression logic only hides the tab when `administrator` is absent from the list entirely, meaning a mixed configuration retaining administrator alongside a lower role still serves the full settings page — including the API key — to the lower-privileged user.

This description is reproduced verbatim from the public vulnerability record.

Sources

This page is compiled automatically from public databases. Accuracy is not guaranteed; confirm against the vendor advisory before acting.

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